

**WEBINAR**

# **THE JOURNEY TO BETTER CYBERSECURITY IN 2022 AND BEYOND**

18TH AUGUST 2022 | 11.00 AM - 12.30 PM

**ORGANISED BY:**



**Varuna Marine Services**  
Smart Sustainable Shipping





# MODERATORS



**Ms.Yipaerguli.Waili(Ipar)**

Sustainability and Business Development  
Manager - Varuna Marine Services B.V.



**Ms. Richa Dutt Nandan**

Marketing Manager  
- Varuna Marine Services B.V.

# BEFORE WE START...



**The webinar will run  
about 1 hour.  
Last 15 mins for Q&A.**



**This webinar is recorded,  
and we will share the  
recording in a blog article  
after the webinar**



**Use the Q&A function to  
send you questions anytime  
during the Webinar.**





**MARITIME CYBER SECURITY**

# PANELISTS FOR TODAY



**MR. PANAGIOTIS ANASTASIOU**


CYBERSECURITY TECHNICAL LEADER –  
BUREAU VERITAS MARINE & OFFSHORE



**MR. SANJEEV WEWERINKE-SINGH**

DIRECTOR – VARUNA MARINE SERVICES B.V.

# POLL QUESTIONS



**The results of the polls will be published along with  
the in a blog article after the webinar**

**WHAT'S NEXT??**





**MR. PANAGIOTIS ANASTASIOU**

CYBERSECURITY TECHNICAL LEADER –  
BUREAU VERITAS MARINE & OFFSHORE





# THE JOURNEY TO BETTER CYBERSECURITY IN 2020 & BEYOND

BUREAU VERITAS MARINE & OFFSHORE

**BUREAU**

**VERITAS**

2022





# AGENDA

01

TRENDS AND  
LESSONS

---

02

KEY  
VULNERABILITIES

---

03

WAY FORWARD

---





01

# TRENDS AND LESSONS

LEARNT FROM INSPECTIONS, CLASS NOTATION GRANTS  
AND AUDITS



BUREAU  
VERITAS





## SHIPS IN SERVICE



## REGULATION

- | IMO Resolution 428(98) enforced since Jan 1st 2021
- 


## MARKET

- | Growing awareness around technical risks
  - | But still only targeting ISM compliance
- 

## MARITIME ATTACKS

- | Maritime Cyber Attacks have increased by 900% in three years
- | Leaked and disclosed ballast water management systems cyber attacks scenarios
- | Infected VPNs





## NEW CONSTRUCTIONS



## SHIPYARDS

- | Scarce investments to introduce cyber security by design
- 

## MARKET

- | Pending entry into force of the IACS regulation
  - | Some welcome active initiatives from cutting-edge shipyard
- 

## REGULATION

- | New UR E26 will enter into force 1st of January 2024
  - Cyber resilience of ships





## MARINE EQUIPMENT



### ISSUES

- | Lack of standards
  - | False beliefs and underestimation about risk of attacks
  - | Nearly nonexistent support on vulnerabilities
  - | Growing interactions with cloud-based solutions
- 

### MARKET

- | Demand is increasing
  - | With already some investments
- 

### REGULATION

- | New UR E27 will enter into force 1st of January 2024
  - Cyber resilience of on-board systems and equipment





02

**KEY VULNERABILITIES**  
AND RISKS THAT KEEP BEING UNCOVERED

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## NEW MARITIME THREATS

### Larger attack surface

- | Digitalization complexity + software obsolescence
- | Connected propulsion or navigation systems

### New threats

- | 3000% surge in IoT malware activity between Q3 2019 and Q4 2020 (Source: IBM)
- | Attack on manufacturers could impact simultaneously all vessels using the same equipment all over the world

### Impacts

- | Cargo loss
- | Time of restoration



## FUTURE MARITIME CHALLENGES

### Piracy

- | Hijacked vessel sea routes and ship manifests lead to a modern form of maritime piracy.
- | Criminal organization could invest against shipping industry
- | Growing usage of Zero-days (16 in 2018, 32 in 2020, 80 in 2021, Source: MANDIANT)
- | Cyber kinetic attacks through OT malware development

### Challenges

- | Maintain the level of cybersecurity on in-service vessels.
- | Prepare Cyber secure vessels by design
- | Push the limits to enable autonomous systems





03

**NEXT TWO YEARS**  
TOWARDS CYBERSECURITY COMPLIANCE



BUREAU  
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# MARITIME DIGITAL EVOLUTION

## FROM 2017 TO 2024

**Globalised Shipping Management**  
**Performance monitoring**

- Vessels operations are digitalized and managed from the shore

**Growing connectivity**  
**On-board networks interconnections**

- Connected propulsion or navigation systems
- SatCom provide growing access to any part of the vessels

**Smart Shipping**  
**Predictive Maintenance**

- Sensors & IoT
- Efficiency
- Remote Maintenance
- Real-Time monitoring
- Data Science

**Digital Twin**  
**Accurate Prediction**

- Correlation with external sources
- Machine Learning
- Minimized risk of human error
- Enhanced port & terminal operations
- End-to-end supply chain optimization

**Unmanned Vessels**  
**Fully remotely controlled**

- All systems remotely operated
- No more manual ship handing over


**Autonomous Vessels**  
**Artificial Intelligence**

- Operations and safety rely at 100% on onboard systems





# REGULATION EVOLUTION FROM 2017 TO 2024







## SHIOWNERS OPPORTUNITIES

### Opportunities

- | See the cyber effort as an enabler, not a constraint
- | Protect both company and vessels from cyberattacks
- | Retain rare experienced teams involved in maritime cyber security
- | Reinforce cyber security on existing vessels to give added value when reselling
- | As of today, ask for cyber securing new construction by design to distinguish from competitors



## SHIPS IN SERVICE

### Class notation in line with IMO Regulation

- | Identification of assets & risks
- | Protection of critical assets
- | Detection through procedures
- | Incident response / recovering procedures
- | Crew training





**NEW CONSTRUCTION**

## **Class notation in line with IACS UR E26**

- | Network segmentation
- | Network traffic protection
- | Logical and physical access management
- | Remote access to onboard equipment
- | Cyber incidents detection
- | Restoration & resilience

## **What's next?**

- | Support for shipyards during 'pilot' phase
- | Design review





## EQUIPMENT

### **Type approval in accordance with IACS UR E27**

- | Software hardening
- | Logical and physical connectivity
- | Testing

### **What's next?**

- | Support for manufacturers during 'pilot' phase
- | Type approval certification



# CONTACT US



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Cybersecurity Technical Leader

Member of IACS Cyber Panel

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# POLL 01



**WEBINAR**

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# POLL 02





**MR. SANJEEV WEWERINKE-SINGH**  
DIRECTOR – VARUNA MARINE SERVICES B.V.





**Varuna Marine Services**  
Smart Sustainable Shipping



**Cyber Waves**  
**ROLLING OUT SOLUTIONS**



# WILL IT AFFECT US?

All four of the largest maritime shipping companies have all been hit by a ransomware attack between 2017 and Sept 2020.

- French shipping giant CMA CGM has been hit by a ransomware attack Sept 2020.
- Mediterranean Shipping Company - hit in April 2020 by an unnamed malware strain that brought down its data center for days.
- COSCO - brought down for weeks by ransomware in July 2018.
- APM-Maersk - taken down for weeks by the NotPetya ransomware/wiper in 2017.





# WHAT SHALL CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT INCLUDE?

## Respond to and recover from cyber security incidents

Respond to and recover from cybersecurity incidents using the contingency plan. Assess the impact of the effectiveness of the response plan and re-assess threats and vulnerabilities.

## Establish response plans

Develop contingency plans to effectively respond to identified cyber risks.

## Identify threats

Understand the external cybersecurity threats to the ship.  
Understand the internal cybersecurity the threat posed by inappropriate use and poor cyber security practices.



## Develop protection and detection measures

Reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited through protection measures.  
Reduce the potential impact of a vulnerability being exploited.

## Identify vulnerabilities

Develop inventories of onboard systems with direct and indirect communications links. Understand the consequences of a cyber security threat on these systems.  
Understand the capabilities and limitations of existing protection measures.

## Assess risk exposure

Determine the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited by external threats.  
Determine the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exposed by inappropriate use.  
Determine the security and safety impact of any individual or combination of vulnerabilities being exploited.



# IACS UR ER 26 and ER 27

- This Unified Requirement is to be uniformly implemented by IACS Societies on ships contracted for construction on or after 1 January 2024 and may be used for other ships as non-mandatory guidance.
- Primary goals is to achieve cyber resilience of ships
  - Identify : Inventory of hardware and software. Inventory to be updated for entire life of ship.
  - Protect : Security zones, Network Protection Safeguard, Antimalware, Access control, Wireless communication, remote access control and communication with untrusted network and use of mobile and potable devices
  - Detect :
    - **Network Operation Monitoring** , Monitoring and recording of device management activities. A monitoring system that can detect anomalies in networks and that can use post-incident analysis provides the ability to appropriately respond and further recover from a cyber event.
    - **Diagnostic functions of CBS and networks** :The ability to verify intended operation of the security functions is important to support management of cyber resilience in the lifetime of the ship. Tools for diagnostic functions may comprise automatic or manual functions such as self-diagnostics capabilities of each device, or tools for network monitoring (such as ping, traceroute, ipconfig, netstat, nslookup, Wireshark, nmap, etc.).
  - Respond : Incident response plan , Local ,independent and/or manual operation , Network isolation, fall back to a minimal risk condition.
  - Recover : Recovery plan , back up and restore capability , Controlled shut down, reset , roll back and restart.



# IACS UR ER 26 and ER 27

- **Test Plan for performance evaluation and testing :**


- ❖ During operational life of the ship, the Shipowner, with the support of Systems Integrator and Suppliers, shall keep the Test Plan up to date and aligned with the CBSs onboard the ship and the networks connecting such systems to each other and to other CBSs not onboard (e.g. ashore).
- ❖ The Shipowner shall update the Test Plan considering the changes occurred on CBSs and networks onboard, possible emerging risks related to such changes, new threats, new vulnerabilities and other possible changes in the ship's operational environment.
- ❖ The Shipowner shall retain onboard a copy of results of execution of tests and an updated Test Plan and make them available to the Classification Society.

- **Risk Assessment**

- ❖ A risk assessment shall be carried out in case any of the CBSs falling under the scope of applicability of this UR is excluded from the application of relevant requirements. The risk assessment shall provide evidence of the acceptable risk level associated to the excluded CBSs.
- ❖ Such exclusion can be accepted by the Classification Society only if evidence is given that the risk level associated to the operation of the CBS is under an acceptable threshold by means of specific risk assessment.
- ❖ During the operational life of the ship, the Shipowner shall update the risk assessment considering the constant changes in the cyber scenario and new weaknesses identified in CBS onboard in a process of continuous improvement.



# Challenges with existing solutions






# 24/7 Network Monitoring : CyberShell

It requires a shift in the security mindset from

"How can I air gap or isolate?" to "How can I stay secure while connected?"

How it works:




# The Virtual Asset

Maritime assets are designed to perform a specific set of functions. For vessels, these include both ship handling and mission-oriented functions. This diagram illustrates several representative functions for a tanker ship and how they are implemented using various onboard networks.


The cyber security risk exposure of an asset is highly dependent on the number of:

1. Safety-critical functions
2. Network connections and interfaces
3. Authorized/unauthorized identities





# System Connections CoCoS-EDS and PMI



- Software:
- CoCoS-EDS
  - PMI

<sup>1</sup> ME engines only  
<sup>2</sup> Optional MAN B&W A/E

AMS: Alarm Monitoring System  
 ECS: Engine Control System<sup>1</sup>  
 MOP: Main Operating Panel  
 ER: Engine Room  
 ECR: Engine Control Room


M/E: Main Engine  
 A/E: Auxiliary Engine  
 EDS: Engine Diagnostics System  
 PMI: Pressure Measurement Instrumentation  
 CoCoS: Computer Controlled Surveillance







# Network Mapping Sample







# Operational Technology (OT) Deployment Options

Apply zero trust principles to securing OT and industrial IoT environments

Blended cybersecurity attacks are driving **convergence of IT, OT, and IoT** security architectures and capabilities



# Ecosystem momentum



<p>Microsoft Partners</p>	
<p>OT Landscape</p>	



# Finished Intelligence

Turning raw data into finished, actionable intelligence.

## CyberShell




## Remote and Onsite OT Systems

### Coverage

- OT and IT
- Fleet-wide / Company-wide
- Own Fleet
- Managed Fleet
- All Systems, Networks and Devices

### Considerations

- Passive OT Monitoring (agentless)
- Low Bandwidth
- Secure Transmission



## Finished Actionable Intelligence



### Monitoring and Alert Management

- 24/7/365
- Tier 1 & Tier 2
- Explanation and direction



### Analytics and Reporting

- Monthly/quarterly reports
- Insights and analysis
- Summarized and actionable




### Threat Hunting

- Proactive searching
- Advanced threats
- Applied threat intelligence

Finished intelligence requires the right tools, technology and domain expertise

# FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS





178

Total Assets

27

Controllers

10

HMIs

1.8 GB

L3 Traffic

8.2 GB

L2 Traffic

219

Alerts

28.02 Kb/s

Current bandwidth



Critical

Health



Top Alerts

All Categories

- Group-to-group communication**  
05/26/2020 18:02:25
- Trickbot trojan communication detected**  
07/18/2020 07:33:16  
192.168.0.102
- Security Incident Detected**  
05/20/2020 14:07:47  
192.168.0.222
- SMB exploitation attempt - MS17-10 EternalBlue**  
06/11/2019 15:42:04  
192.168.1.24
- Vulnerability assessment tool detected - Nessus**  
08/28/2017 11:22:38  
192.168.1.16
- TeamViewer inbound connection established**  
08/16/2020 07:33:51  
192.168.1.135
- TeamViewer inbound connection established**  
05/26/2020 16:17:08

Industrial Protocols

Show Others


Select Protocols

Protocols Report



Alerts

SEVERITY TYPE CATEGORY DAILY



Alerts Pivot by Type

View Report by Type




Alert Type	Severity	# of Alerts
API	Critical	2
Vulnerability assessment tool dete...	Critical	1
Trickbot trojan communication det	Critical	1

Assets Pivot

Select Dimension Device type

Device type	Total
Others	88
Workstation	24

# Assets Manager

Select Columns All Types Type exact IP   

- L3 Assets
- L2 Assets
- External Hosts
- Assets Pivot
- Threat Assessment

IP	Hostname	MAC	Vendor	OS	Device types	Alerts	# Int.	# Ext.	Total Traffic	First seen	Last Seen
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.170</a>	Mitsubishi ...	58:52:8A:B7:AB:...	Mitsubishi ...		PLC	1 1	4	0	11.27 MB	03/17/2019 12:29:14	04/24/2019 14:14:53
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.125</a>	Eng_STA_6	00:0C:29:8B:18:D6	VMware, Inc.	Windows 7	Engineering...	2 1	2	0	11.21 MB	03/17/2019 13:53:28	03/17/2019 15:21:06
+ <a href="#">10.11.0.154</a>		5C:F9:DD:73:FF:...	Dell Inc.	Windows	Engineering...	0	1	0	8.49 MB	08/28/2019 10:48:56	08/28/2019 10:49:52
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.155</a>	PLC-9054e	00:24:59:0A:A9:C4	ABB Autom...		PLC	1	3	0	6.86 MB	03/17/2019 12:19:42	04/24/2019 14:09:15
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.123</a>	Eng_STA_1	00:0C:29:17:D1:76	VMware, Inc.	Windows 7	Engineering...	1 1	8	0	6.17 MB	03/17/2019 12:19:43	03/17/2019 13:08:03
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.140</a>	PLC-TE246	00:80:F4:1B:CD:22	Telemehan...		PLC	1	5	0	5.56 MB	03/17/2019 12:19:50	04/24/2019 14:16:50
+ <a href="#">10.11.0.202</a>		F4:54:33:AD:39:7A	Rockwell A...		PLC	1 1	1	0	5.52 MB	05/26/2020 14:56:38	05/26/2020 15:27:04
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.107</a>	Eng_STA_4	00:0C:29:58:97:76	VMware, Inc.	Windows 7	Engineering...	2	3	0	5.41 MB	03/17/2019 15:00:43	06/11/2019 15:42:04
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.135</a>		AC:64:17:12:5C:51	Siemens AG		PLC	1 2	5	0	4.38 MB	03/17/2019 12:20:09	04/24/2019 14:16:52
+ <a href="#">10.117.2.17</a>	xperion_srvb	00:10:18:C8:98:00	Broadcom	Windows S...	Experion eS...	1 1	43	0	3.5 MB	10/19/2020 14:32:02	10/27/2020 15:23:14
+ <a href="#">10.212.120.200</a>		00:FF:84:41:5A:19	AP-NordVPN		VPN client	0	0	0	2.72 MB	04/10/2016 07:12:12	04/10/2016 07:33:19
+ <a href="#">10.117.1.11</a>	xperion_srv...	00:10:18:C0:86:FC	Broadcom	Windows S...	Experion eS...	1 1	51	0	2.54 MB	10/19/2020 14:32:03	10/27/2020 15:22:14
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.141</a>	Schneider_...	00:80:F4:1B:CD:22	Telemehan...			1	46	1	2.54 MB	03/17/2019 12:19:45	04/24/2019 14:09:14
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.130</a>		28:63:36:7E:85:49	Siemens AG		PLC	1	6	0	2.48 MB	03/17/2019 12:19:43	04/24/2019 14:16:53
+ <a href="#">192.168.0.50</a>	Eng_STA_2	00:0C:29:65:1C:29	VMware, Inc.	Windows 7	VoIP	1	1	0	2.41 MB	03/17/2019 13:23:18	03/17/2019 13:49:24



● 192.168.0.170 (Mitsubishi R04) 

● 1 Information ● 1 Threat Connections: 4 Internal

5 Exposure Groups

Device types:	PLC	
OS:		
Hostname:	Mitsubishi R04	 
Vendor:	Mitsubishi Electric Corporation	
MAC:	58:52:8A:B7:AB:EC	
First seen:	March 17th 2019, 12:29:14	
Last Seen:	April 24th 2019, 14:14:53	
NIC Type:	Ethernet	

## Additional Details

Module name: R04CPU

## Organization Details

Criticality:	High	 
OU:	Substation_12	 
Owner:	Harry D.	 
Physical Location:		 
Comment:		 
Product for CVE:		 
Version for CVE:		 

## ▲ Open Alerts



ID	Severity ↓	Description	Status	Details	MITRE ATT&CK	Alert Time	
190	●	PLC start command issued	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.0.125 (Eng_STA_6)</a> sent a PLC start command to PLC on <a href="#">192.168...</a>	Execution > Change Pr...	03/17/2019 14:06:47	
116	●	New host detected	Created	New host detected: <a href="#">192.168.0.170 (Mitsubishi R04)</a> from source: ARP Packet.		03/17/2019 12:29:14	

⏪ &lt; 1 &gt; ⏩

1 - 2 of 2 items

Connections

Exposure Map

Layered Map

Subnet  
Topology

All Types


Search IP/Hostname

Hostname & IP address

All data



YES  Connections only





# Network Maps

Logical Groups

Connections

Exposure Map

Layered Map

Subnet  
Topology


IP labels

All data



Layered Map Purdue Model

Direction



# Traffic Analyzer

Protocols over Time

< IP Conversations

TCP/UDP Conversations

Protocols

Industrial Protocols

Industrial Layer 2 >

All Protocols

Type Port

All data



Protocol	Dest. Port	Trans...	A to B Packets	B to A Packets	A to B Bytes	B to A Bytes	Total ↓
BACnet/IP	47808	UDP	836.77K	831.72K	197.35 MB	253.34 MB	450.68 MB



Conv...	Source IP	Src. Port	Dest. IP	A to B Packets	B to A Packets	A to B Bytes	B to A Bytes	Total ↓	In...
1	<a href="#">10.15.5.102</a>	generic	<a href="#">10.15.5.111</a>	124.44K	124.46K	82.2 MB	125.65 MB	207.85 MB	
1	<a href="#">10.15.5.111</a>	47808	<a href="#">10.15.5.127</a>	364.05K	364.03K	58.4 MB	45.79 MB	104.18 MB	
6	<a href="#">10.15.5.100</a>	47809	<a href="#">10.15.5.111</a>	107.59K	105.12K	19.92 MB	28.19 MB	48.1 MB	
1	<a href="#">10.15.5.102</a>	generic	<a href="#">10.15.5.112</a>	62.57K	62.53K	13.16 MB	20.02 MB	33.17 MB	
1	<a href="#">10.15.5.102</a>	generic	<a href="#">10.15.5.113</a>	61.91K	61.84K	13.12 MB	19.98 MB	33.1 MB	
6	<a href="#">10.15.5.100</a>	47809	<a href="#">10.15.5.112</a>	93.42K	91.8K	7.3 MB	8.89 MB	16.2 MB	
5	<a href="#">10.15.5.100</a>	47809	<a href="#">10.15.5.113</a>	16.86K	15.28K	2.71 MB	4.14 MB	6.85 MB	
2	<a href="#">192.168.0.180</a>	47808	<a href="#">192.168.0.181</a>	5.36K	5.98K	498.59 KB	629.29 KB	1.13 MB	
1	<a href="#">192.168.0.176</a>	47808	<a href="#">192.168.0.180</a>	444	444	32.76 KB	39.75 KB	72.5 KB	
1	<a href="#">192.168.0.20</a>	65536	<a href="#">192.168.0.181</a>	112	233	7.06 KB	16.64 KB	23.7 KB	

1 2

1 - 10 of 11 items

+	Modbus/TCP	502	TCP	2.28M	2.06M	135.72 MB	123.01 MB	248.54 MB
+	iPulse-ICS	20222	TCP	49.17K	85.17K	3.01 MB	101.41 MB	104.42 MB
+	HTTPS	443	TCP	102.99K	80.75K	12.69 MB	88.81 MB	101.5 MB
+	MS-SQL-s	1433	TCP	638.64K	637.78K	40.64 MB	41.37 MB	82.01 MB



# Alerts Manager

Alerts Policy Firewall Rules Logs

Open 219

Resolved 97

Don't show 1

Stale 90

All 316

Alerts Pivot

Select Columns

All Types

All Severities



Mark 0 selected as Resolved

<input type="checkbox"/>	ID	Severity ↓	Description	Status	IP	Hostname	Details	Last Event Time
<input type="checkbox"/>	50100	●	Group-to-group communication	In Progress			User rule "Unauthorized Traffic": Communication between group "DMZ_Plant...	05/26/2020 18:02:25
<input type="checkbox"/>	1446	●	Trickbot trojan communication detected	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.0.102</a>	desktop-cs7vbmu	<a href="#">192.168.0.102 (desktop-cs7vbmu)</a> is communicating with a Trickbot C&C ser...	07/18/2020 07:33:16
<input type="checkbox"/>	554	●	Security Incident Detected	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.0.222</a>	WSTA_4	Multiple alerts on this IP.	05/20/2020 14:08:03
<input type="checkbox"/>	465	●	SMB exploitation attempt - MS17-10 Ete...	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.1.24</a>	tech-ws-18	SMB exploit detected - device <a href="#">192.168.1.24 (tech-ws-18)</a> sent an exploit to d...	02/19/2020 16:18:14
<input type="checkbox"/>	10	●	Vulnerability assessment tool detected - ...	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.1.16</a>	scadafence-pc	Nessus communication detected from <a href="#">192.168.1.16 (scadafence-pc)</a> to target...	02/12/2020 13:31:08
<input type="checkbox"/>	50103	●	TeamViewer inbound connection establis...	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.1.135</a>	scadafence-rbi10d	TeamViewer inbound connection was established from device 213.227.181.1...	08/16/2020 07:34:08
<input type="checkbox"/>	51888	●	TeamViewer inbound connection establis...	In Progress	<a href="#">10.11.0.200</a>	powersvr1	TeamViewer inbound connection was established from device <a href="#">192.168.1.135 (...)</a>	08/16/2020 07:34:08
<input type="checkbox"/>	559	●	Communication with vulnerable device	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.0.132</a>	plc_32	Industrial device <a href="#">192.168.0.132 (plc_31)</a> has communicated with device 192.1...	11/05/2020 13:12:37
<input type="checkbox"/>	518	●	Domain reputation alert	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.0.101</a>	WS-yk75	Device <a href="#">192.168.0.101 (WS-yk75)</a> tried to resolve a known malicious domain n...	02/12/2020 13:31:08
<input type="checkbox"/>	50102	●	New Source IP Connecting to industrial ...	In Progress	<a href="#">10.11.0.202</a>		Unexpected conversation detected between IP address <a href="#">10.11.0.154 (Enginee...</a>	05/22/2020 08:22:29
<input type="checkbox"/>	50101	●	Industrial parameter value out of range	In Progress	<a href="#">10.11.38.100</a>		User rule Analog Value Validation (profile-based): Device <a href="#">10.11.38.100</a> , report...	08/29/2017 02:59:23
<input type="checkbox"/>	51867	●	Programming read command detected	In Progress	<a href="#">10.11.0.202</a>		<a href="#">10.11.0.200 (powersvr1)</a> sent a programming read sequence to PLC on <a href="#">10.11...</a>	05/26/2020 15:07:34
<input type="checkbox"/>	50042	●	Programming write command detected	In Progress	<a href="#">10.77.60.131</a>	PLC_131	<a href="#">10.77.1.60 (win-k4tva753kkg)</a> sent a programming write sequence to PLC on ...	07/29/2018 10:44:20
<input type="checkbox"/>	50019	●	PLC stop command issued	In Progress	<a href="#">10.77.0.140</a>	PLC_140	<a href="#">10.77.1.60 (win-k4tva753kkg)</a> sent a PLC stop command to PLC on <a href="#">10.77.0.1...</a>	01/16/2019 13:30:38
<input type="checkbox"/>	50001	●	PLC stop command issued	In Progress	<a href="#">192.168.60.150</a>		<a href="#">192.168.60.11</a> sent a PLC stop command to PLC on <a href="#">192.168.60.150</a> , using ...	05/17/2020 16:58:10

NIST-CSF

Production Lines: 1-3

Max IPs (max 50) 50

Display only relevant alerts

Generate


Export

- NERC-CIP
- ISO-27001
- NIST-1800-23
- NCSC-CAF
- CMMCS
- CMMC2
- CMMC Level 1

## Compliance Governance Report

Site: Production Lines: 1-3

Standard: NIST-CSF

 Report issued on: Jun 15, 2021  
Issued by: admin



## Security Report Configuration



DISPLAY PARAMETERS

SECTION VISIBILITY

MAPS CONFIGURATION

- Analysis Summary
- Top IPs at Risk
- Asset Inventory
- Network Map
- Exposure Models
- Layered Maps
- Protocol Statistics
- Bandwidth Usage
- Subnets Discovered
- Open Security Alerts
- Network Anomalies
- Open CVEs
- About SCADAfence

Cancel

Update Report

# THANK YOU!

You can reach us at:

- [info@varunamarine.eu](mailto:info@varunamarine.eu)
- [technical@varunamarine.eu](mailto:technical@varunamarine.eu)
- [tech@cyberwaves.eu](mailto:tech@cyberwaves.eu)

OR

Visit our website for more information:  
[www.varunamarine.eu](http://www.varunamarine.eu)



**WEBINAR**

# **THE JOURNEY TO BETTER CYBERSECURITY IN 2022 AND BEYOND**

18TH AUGUST 2022 | 11.00 AM - 12.30 PM

**ORGANISED BY:**



**Varuna Marine Services**  
Smart Sustainable Shipping



# POLL 03





**WEBINAR**

# **THE JOURNEY TO BETTER CYBERSECURITY IN 2022 AND BEYOND**

18TH AUGUST 2022 | 11.00 AM - 12.30 PM

**ORGANISED BY:**




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Smart Sustainable Shipping





# POLL 04



**KEY**

**TAKEAWAYS**



# Thank You



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